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PETITION FOR REHEARING

Respondent, Tatsumi Misaka, through his counsel of record,
petitions the Court for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals, on the following grounds:
POINT I
THE COURT'S OPINION IMPROPERLY CONSTRUES THE SIGNATURE
REQUIREMENT OF UTAH CODE ANN. §75-2-503
A "signature" is required under Utah Code Ann. §75-2-503 in
order for a person to validly execute a holographic will.

The

requirement of a signature could be used to accomplish a variety
of purposes, not all of which are consistent with the existing
legislative intent to allow a will to be signed in the body of the
document.

The signature requirement could act to identify the

testator and to prevent fraud due to the difficulty of forging a
signature.

The signature requirement could further act to show

the testator's understanding of the importance and legal significance which accompanies a will, and that the testator intends the
document, whether or not presently completed, to be his will.
Finally, the signature requirement could act to show the finality
of the instrument or to protect against deletions of portions of
the will.
In its Opinion in this case, this Court interpreted the
signature requirement of the Utah statute as including the purpose
of showing the finality of the will:
"The purpose of our statutory scheme is to
1

require a course of conduct which assures that
a person's will is reduced to handwriting, and
when handwritten, that the intention is to have
the writing take legal effect be indicated by
a signature which records the fact. The signature requirement shows that the writer finally
approved the writing and meant for it to be
operative as a testamentary instrument."
Estate of Erickson v. Misaka, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 66 (Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 1988).
This

interpretation

would

be consistent

with

a

statute

requiring that a will be signed at the end, but is inconsistent
with the Utah Uniform Probate Code
signature in the body of the will.

("UUPC") which allows a

"There is no requirement that

the testator's name be at the end of the will; thus, if he writes
his name in the body of the will and intends it to be his
signature, this would satisfy the statute."

Editorial Board

Comment to Section 2-502 of the Uniform Probate Code.
In allowing

wills to be

signed

in the body,

the UUPC

implicitly rejects the possible purpose that the signature act to
show the finality of a will.

A will which is signed in the body

is necessarily signed before the written language of the will is
complete.

Thus, the "signature" requirement of Utah Code Ann.

§75-2-503 should not be construed to mean that the handwritten
name must be placed on the will to show a final approval of the
completed document.

Imposing a requirement of a specific intent

that the handwritten name in the body of the will be put there

2

for the purpose of authenticating the completed will defeats
legislative intent of allowing a will to be signed in the body,
and also defeats the broad purpose of the Uniform Probate Code to
"validate wills whenever possible."

General Comment to Part 5,

Editorial Board Comment of the Uniform Probate Code.
The Court Opinion implies further that the signature requirement under the UUPC is also intended to protect against deletions.
"Without more, it is an inadequate guard against writing being
deleted..."

Erickson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66.

Again, such a

purpose is consistent only with a will statute requiring a
signature at the end.

The intent of the UUPC to allow a will to

be signed in the body implicitly indicates that the purposes for
the signature requirement do not include safeguarding the will
against deletions, because a signature in the body of the will
does not serve to indicate an absolute ending, as a signature at
the end would.
The record reflects no evidence to indicate that cards were
deleted in the present case, nor does it reflect where the
holographic document was found or the circumstances in which it
was found.

Appellant indicated in oral argument and the Opinion

reflects that the cards were discovered in a desk drawer along
with other belongings of decedent.

If the Court finds this to be

relevant even though not in the record, the Court should also

3

allow additional evidence to be presented by Mr. Misaka to show
that he was not in a position to delete additional cards because
the holographic document was found by the Personal Representative
of the Estate or members of decedent's family, and then brought
to Mr. Misaka's attention by the Personal Representative.
While the Utah statute does not support a requirement that the
signature act to show finality or to guard against deletions, the
Editorial

Board

Comment

to

Section

2-502

indicates

that

"signatureff should mean something more than just the testator's
handwritten name. The purpose of the signature requirement under
the UUPC should be to show the testator's understanding of the
legal significance of the act he is undertaking, that is, the act
of making a will.

Thus, the signature requirement should be

construed to validate wills containing the testator's handwritten
name in the will body in a context which demonstrates the
testator's operative intent for the language to follow, showing
the

testator's

understanding

of

the

importance

significance of the document being prepared.

and

legal

The holographic

document at issue meets that requirement and should be validated.
A handwritten name in the document for purposes of identifying
property would not meet that requirement.

See, Nelson v. Texar-

kana Historical Soc'y and Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W.2d 882
(1974); In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952)

4

(dissent of J. Traynor). A handwritten name in an exordium clause
clearly indicating that the document to follow is a will, however,
would meet that standard and should constitute a signature unless
the writer otherwise demonstrated that he did not consider the
will effective without further signing the will.
struction is not contrary to the general statutory

This con-

definition of

"signature11 contained in Utah Code Ann. §68-3-12(2)(r) (Supp.
1988) because the language preceding that definition provides that
lf

[T]he

following

definitions

shall

be

observed,

unless the

definition would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute."

Id. at

§68-3-12(2).
The courts of other jurisdictions have generally reached
conclusions consistent with the above standard.

In Smith v.

McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972) the court validated
the will which began "I, Julian Leland Rutherford...do hereby
make,

publish

testament..."

and

declare

this

to

be

my

last

will

and

The same court, in Nelson v. Texarkana Historical

Socfy and Museum, 257 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 882 (1972) found the
signature requirement not met where the testator's handwritten
name only appeared in the context of stating that certain property
was given in memory of the testator. The California Supreme Court
has adopted a standard even broader than the proposed standard,
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finding that intent to sign can be shown by the handwritten name
of the testator in the phrase "Bonds belonging solely to Helene
I. Bloch."
(1952).

In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d 21

Two of the cases cited by the Court in Footnote 3 of the

Opinion to support the position that in proper circumstances a
handwritten name in the body of the will could be written with the
intent to be a signature actually found the handwritten names to
be signatures without any evidence except language in the will
supporting the testator's operative intent for the document. See
In re Estate of Glass, 165 Cal. App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958)
and Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1964).

These cases

support the proposed standard rather than the standard adopted by
the Court.

The conclusion of the court in Estate of Fegley, 42

Colo. App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978) is consistent with the proposed
standard because the format of the will, containing a blank
signature space followed by an attestation clause, indicated that
the testator intended to take further action to validate the will.
POINT II
THE HOLOGRAPHIC DOCUMENT MEETS THE SIGNATURE
STANDARD ADOPTED BY THE COURT
Even if the Court does not revise the signature requirement
set out in its Opinion, the holographic document at issue should
be found to meet that requirement.
blue ink as follows:
6

The will at issue begins in

Last Will & Test
I Robert E. Erickson do hereby state that I
leave and bequeath to the following persons of
my family and others.,..
Approximately two-thirds of the way down the first card, in the
middle of a sentence, the writing changes from blue to black ink.
The remainder of the first card and all of the second and third
cards are written in the black ink. Additionally, the underlined
date "8/22/73" was subsequently added to the upper right hand
corner of the first card, as shown by the underlined date being
in black ink and partially covering the letter "L" at the beginning of the words "Last Will & Test".
The Court has improperly given no weight to the language
immediately surrounding the Testator's handwritten name in the
exordium clause.

The language "I Robert E. Erickson do hereby

state that I leave and bequeath..." immediately underneath the
title "Last Will & Test," shows clear operative intent that the
document he was preparing served as his will. The Testator could
hardly have expressed his intent more clearly.

The language "do

hereby state" shows the intent of the Testator to validate the
will with the handwritten name which immediately precedes those
words.

The courts in other states have recognized a handwritten

name in an exordium clause to be evidence of an intent to validate
or authenticate the will by placing the name in that context. See
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Smith v, McDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481 S.W.2d 741 (1972), and In re
Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248 P.2d (1952) (dissent of J.
Traynor).
In addition to the language in the exordium, the Testator came
back after the fact and dated the document, thereby acknowledging
and adopting the handwritten name in the exordium clause as his
signature.

The subsequent dating of the will indicates that Mr.

Erickson had completed the will and done everything he intended
to do.

Case law supports the concept of a person "adopting" a

prior handwritten name as a signature.

In In re Kinney's Estate,

16 Cal.2d 50, 104 P.2d 782 (1940), the court found the signature
adopted based on the will being "complete."

The court said that

a will was not complete if it appeared from the instrument that
the decedent had not "done everything they intended to do."

See

also, Estate of McCarty, 27 Cal. Rptr. 94, 211 Cal. App.2d 23
(1962) (signature adopted by underlining at later date).

Thus,

even if the Court retains the legal standard for a signature
contained in its Opinion, the decision of the trial court should
be affirmed because the Respondent met its prima facia burden of
proof that the will contained the Testator's signature.
The Court Opinion reads into the statute a specific intent
requirement that the testator's handwritten name be "written with
the intent that it operate as an authentication of the document

8

as a will" to accompany the general intent requirement that
testamentary intent be present.
66.

Erickson, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at

Reaching the conclusion that a person intended an entire

document, including the handwritten name, to be a will, but that
the will is invalid because no specific intent to sign the will
is shown, is a conclusion that defies the purpose of the UUPC to
validate wills whenever possible.

In Estate of Black, 641 P.2d

754 (1982), the California Supreme Court stated:
If testators are to be encouraged by a statute
like ours to draw their own wills, the courts
should not adopt, upon purely technical reasoning, a construction which would result in
invalidating such wills in half the cases.
If the handwritten name must be placed in the will with the
specific intent of authenticating the completed document as a
will, then the existence of testamentary intent should allow an
inference to be drawn that a name written in the body of the will
was done with the intent that it be a signature and authenticate
the document. The trial court found the existence of testamentary
intent regarding the holographic document at issue, based on
extrinsic

evidence

as well

as

the document

itself.

That

testamentary intent infers the existence of the decedent's intent
that his handwritten name was placed

in exordium clause to

authenticate the will, especially in light of the surrounding
language in the exordium clause.

9

The Court's Opinion addresses several aspects of the holographic document which should bear no weight as to either the issue
of whether the will contains a signature or the issue of testamentary intent.

In addition to the discussion below, Respondent's

Brief previously filed addresses the nature of the holographic
document at pages 18-21. The fact that the will is written on the
unlined side of index cards does not in any way imply a lack of
either intent to sign or testamentary intent.

The relevant

inquiry is what was written, not the material which contains the
writing.

This Court has recognized that immaterial language on

pre-printed forms can be ignored in validating holographic wills.
Estate of Fitzgerald, 738 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

In the

same manner, the use of the lined or the unlined side of the cards
is irrelevant.
The fact that the index cards are not attached to each other
has no bearing on signatory intent or testamentary intent.

The

Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in In re Love's Estate,
75 Utah 342, 285 P.299 (1930), stating that several loose or
detached sheets may serve as a will if, as is the present case,
the sheets can be coherently read together as a will and contain
nothing out of harmony with the general conception of a will. The
present cards meet that standard.
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The Court states that the nature of the cards suggest that the
cards are unfinished or constitute a draft.

By allowing laymen

to prepare holographic wills, the Utah statute sets a priority on
carrying out the testator's intent rather than on the form of the
instrument.

Admittedly, the holographic document at issue is

crude, but that crudeness does not bear on the requisites for a
valid holographic will.

The fact that the first card was subse-

quently dated indicates that the cards were completed.

Nothing

in the cards indicates that the decedent intended to take any
further action to complete the will.

The mere fact that the

decedent could have disposed of additional property if he chose
to do

so does

not

support

a conclusion

that

the will is

incomplete, especially where decedent's prior will is not revoked
by the holographic document at issue. Even if the cards were not
completed, however, the broad purpose of the UUPC to validate
wills whenever possible should support validating a will which
otherwise meets the statutory requirements. In the present case,
the clear language of the exordium clause and the subsequent
dating are far better evidence of the testator's intent to sign
the will than the rough nature of the documents.
In regard to the possibility that the cards were a "draft,"
an intent to later prepare a more formal document does not
preclude or detract from the testator's intent in regard to an

11

earlier document*

In re Kutter's Estate, 160 Cal. App.2d 322,

325, P.2d 624, 631 (1958); Richberg v. Robbins, 33 Term. App. 66,
228 S.W.2d 1019, 1022 (1950); In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d
456, 461 (W.Va. 1982).
POINT III
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT BASED
ON ISSUES NOT RAISED BY DEFENDANT
As stated by the Court in its Opinion in this case, "the
parties and the court below seem to have focused on the broader
issue of whether decedent intended these cards to be his will...,"
Erickson, 98 Utah. Adv. Rep. at 66, and "[T]he findings and
conclusions entered by the trial court, as well as the appellate
briefs for both parties, fail to distinguish intent for these two
different purposes."

Id. at 67 fn. 2.

At the trial, the Personal Representative of the Estate, the
Appellant herein, raised only the issue that testamentary intent
did not exist regarding the will.

(R-128-175).

See specifically

the Personal Representative's argument for dismissal following Mr.
Misaka's evidence (R 147-150) and closing argument (R 171-173).
In arguing that testamentary intent was lacking, the Personal
Representative did cite In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal.2d 570, 248
P.2d 21 (1952) regarding affixing the signature with intent to
authenticate (R-148), but did so only as part of his argument that
testamentary intent was lacking.
12

Further, while the issue was

also addressed in the Personal Representatives discussion of
points (R 106-111), that document was filed some 17 days after
trial and 12 days after the Court's Order (R 104), and contained
no legal authority on the issue except a citation to 19 ALR.2d
926.

The Personal Representative's brief addresses directly only

the issue of testamentary
addressing

intent

to

intent, while in that discussion

authenticate

as part

of

that

overall

testamentary intent.
While it is proper for a court on appeal to affirm based on
grounds not raised at the trial level, see Branch v. Western
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that an issue will not be considered for
the first time on appeal in cases where the new issue is raised
to reverse the trial court's decision.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).

See, e.g., Traynor v.
As this Court stated in

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987):
"Theories or issues which are not apparent or
reasonably discernable from the pleadings,
affidavits,
and
exhibits
will
not
be
considered." Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565
P.2d 835, 838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even
if pleadings are generously interpreted, if
they are not supported by any factual showing
or by the submission of legal authority, they
are not presented for decision.
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In the present case, the Personal Representative's failure to
clearly raise the issue falls within the perimeters of James v.
Preston, and should not be considered by this Court on appeal.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Tatsumi Misaka, prays that the Court
grant this Petition for Rehearing and revise its Opinion to affirm
the trial court's judgment.
Respectfully submitted this Z£)

day of January, 1989.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL
UJ1

KEN IK JONES
Attorney^ for Respondent,
Tatsumi Misaka
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